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Comments

IMPEACHMENT, USE IMMUNITY AND THE
PERJURIOUS DEFENDANT

I. INTRODUCTION
When the accused in a criminal trial takes the witness stand
in his own behalf, he puts his credibility into issue.1 If he is successfully impeached 2 by the prosecutor, his case may be irreparably damaged.8 This Comment considers the situation in which the
prosecutor proposes to impeach the accused with testimony given
by him under a grant of immunity at an earlier unrelated hearing.
Such a situation involves both evidentiary and constitutional problems. The question must be answered whether such an impeachment would be permissible from an evidentiary standpoint. Emphasis is placed on the extent to which courts have allowed defendants to escape damaging impeachment by the careful tailoring of their direct testimony. Appellate courts have found error
in the impeachment of a defendant who takes the stand to deny
only an element of the crime, 4 but they have not been so restrictive of the trial judge's discretion when the defendant testifies
1. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Barclay, 178 Pa. Super, 568, 115 A.2d
405 (1955). See also 3A J. WirmonRE, EVIDENCE § 889 (Chadbourne rev.
1970).
2. Impeachment is a word of art, see note 89 and accompanying text
infra. See also, 3A J. WIoRMOP, EVIENCE, §§ 875-881 (Chadbourne rev.
1970) for the definitive analysis of the concept.
3. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hill v. Pinto, 394 F.2d 470, 476
(3d Cir. 1968); Commonwealth v. Burkett, 211 Pa. Super. 299, 310, 235 A.2d
161 (1967) (concurring opinion by Hoffman, J.).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Agnello, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).

broadly. 5 As the second aspect of the evidentiary issue, it is suggested that the suppressed confession of Harris v. New York 6 is
sufficiently analogous to immune testimony to make that decision
helpful in determining probable judicial policy toward the admission of the immune testimony which would be excluded under other
circumstances from the defendant's trial.
Even though the evidentiary questions may be resolved in
favor of the prosecution's intended impeachment, constitutional issues are raised by the later use for impeachment of sworn testimony given under a statutory grant of immunity. The resolution
of these issues depends on the court's determination of the scope of
a grant of immunity. If the immunity grant is to be the true
equivalent of silence,7 then it appears that such testimony, even
though clearly contradicted by that which the defendant says on
the stand, should not be permitted to be used. Assuming for purposes of this Comment that the defendant is testifying in a later
unrelated trial in direct contradiction to his sworn testimony given
under the earlier grant of immunity, the suggested impeachment
puts the Court's strong policy against allowing a defendant to lie
on the witness stand" at loggerheads with the rational expansion
of court policy on immunity.
II.

THE SCOPE OF PERMISSIBLE IMPEACHMENT

When an accused takes the witness stand, the federal courts
will allow a full cross-examination as to those matters to which
he has testified on direct 9 and will permit some latitude when the
cross-examiner seeks to impeach the credibility of the accused. 10
With exceptions," the general practice relating to impeachment is
to treat the accused like any other witness. 12 For example, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit cited the
6. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
5. See, e.g., Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
7. See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972).
8. See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); Walder v. United
States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
9. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, reh. denied, 356
U.S. 948 (1958); Lewis v. United States, 373 F.2d 576 (9th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 880 (1968).
10. See, e.g., Stewart v. United States, 366 U.S. 2 (1961); Speers v,
United States, 387 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 956 (1968).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Keilly, 445 F.2d 1285 (2d Cir. 1971) (Evidence not admitted to prove criminal character of the accused); Commonwealth v. McIntyre, 417 Pa. 415, 208 A.2d 257 (1965) (Evidence of crimes
committed after date of crime charged resulted in prejudice).
12. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1958); Sawyer v.
United States, 202 U.S. 150 (1905); United States v. Angello, 452 F.2d 1135,
1139 (2d Cir. 1971); United States v. Vigo, 413 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Morefield, 411 F.2d 1186, 1188 (7th Cir. 1969); United States
v. Jackson, 344 F.2d 922 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 880; United
States v. Sweeney, 262 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1959).
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Advisory Committee's1 3 notes as reflective of the rationale supporting liberal use of prior convictions to impeach the accused:
[T] he purpose of having the accused testify is the belief that he may be believed despite his self interest. Consequently, anything which aids in appraising his credibility
must be of value. Disallowing the conviction evidence enables the accused to appear as a person whose character
entitles him to credence, when the fact is to the contrary,
argument to the witness-accused
and denies a valuable 14
who has no prior record.
Adopting the traditional rationale'" favoring broad cross-examination, the Advisory Committee rejected possible alternative resolutions which included (1) allowing no impeachment by conviction;
(2) allowing only crimen falsi; (3) excluding impeachment by conviction if the crime is similar; (4) allowing conviction evidence
only if the accused first introduces evidence of character for truthfulness; and (5) leaving the matter to the discretion of the trial
judge.1 6 Only in the fourth proposal would the conduct of the
defendant's direct examination make any difference in the out17
come.
The leading case with respect to the admission of evidence
relating to an accused's prior convictions and generally applicable
to the broad field of impeachment is Luck v. United States'8 which
suggests that the trial judge should control the admission of impeachment evidence through his discretion:
The statute, 1 i our view, leaves room for the opera=
tion of sound judicial discretion to play upon the circumstances as they unfold in a particular case. There may
well be cases where the trial judge might think that the
cause of truth would be helped more by letting the jury
hear the defendant's story than by the defendant's foregoing that opportunity because of the fear of prejudice
founded upon a prior conviction. There may well be other
cases where the trial judge believes the prejudicial effect
of impeachment far outweighs the probative relevance of
the prior conviction to the issue of credibility. This last is,
13. PRELIINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURTS AND MAGISTRATES [hereinafter PRELIMINARY DRAFT]

rule 6-09, note at 126 (Prelim. Draft, March, 1965).

14.

United States v. Escobedo, 430 F.2d 14, 19 (7th Cir. 1970).

15.

See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, § 21 (2d ed. 1972).

16. See United States v. Escobedo, 430 F.2d 14, 19 (7th Cir. 1970);
See also PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra, note 13 at rule 6-09, note at 126.
17. See Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 66 (1954).
18. 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
19. 14 D.C. CODE ANN. § 305 (1961). This statute was interpreted by
the lower court as mandating the admission of prior convictions in every
case.

of course, a standard which trial judges apply every day in
other contexts; and 20we think it has both utility and applicability in this field.
In Gordon v. United States,21 Judge, now Chief Justice, Burger
suggested that when a court is considering the use of its discretion, it should look to the legitimate purpose of impeachment, i.e.
"to show background facts which bear directly on whether jurors
ought to believe him rather than other and conflicting witnesses. ' '22 The court's "rule of thumb" reflects what it termed the
"common human experience":
A 'rule of thumb' thus should be that convictions
which rest on dishonest conduct relate to credibility
whereas those of violent or assaultive crimes generally do
not; traffic violations, however serious, are in the same
category. The nearness or remoteness of a prior conviction is also a factor of no small importance....
Where multiple convictions of various kinds can
be shown, strong reasons arise for excluding those which
are for the same crime because of the inevitable, pressure
on lay jurors to believe
that 'if he did it before, he proba23
bly did so this time.'
The last point is instructive in that it clearly illustrates the
proper role of impeachment and the delicate dividing line between
an attack on a defendant's tendency to tell the truth and an impermissible use of past deeds to prejudice the jury against the defendant. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 24 faced this situation when a district court had allowed the
prosecution to bring out a defendant's two prior convictions for
transporting a stolen automobile in interstate commerce when the
crime for which he was being prosecuted was still another such
violation. The majority of the court affirmed based on precedent, 21
but the dissent argued that the prosecution's interrogation should
have been restricted to eliciting the number of prior convictions
and that they were felonies, "without any reference which would
20.

Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1965); See gen-

erally, PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED
AND MAGISTRATES which provide in pertinent part:

STATES DISTRICT COURTS

For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence
that he has been convicted of a crime ...

is admissible but only if

. . . the judge determines that the probative value of the evidence
of the crime is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice.
PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE

FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS AND

MAGISTRATES, rule 609 (Rev. Draft, March, 1971) [hereinafter PROPOSED
RuLEs]; the Model Rules are generally in accord:
The Judge may in his discretion exclude evidence if he finds that
its probative value is outweighed by the risk that its admission will
. . . create substantial danger or undue prejudice.
A.L.I. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw 180 (Philadelphia 1942).
21. 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
22. Id. at 940.
23. Id.
24. Bindelow v. United States, 418 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1969).
25. Id. at 47.
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give the jury to understand that they were for precisely the same
26
offense.
The prosecution would have obtained substantially all
the legitimate benefit it sought by showing the appellant
not credible because a repetitive felon. The difference between lack of credibility as a repetitive felon and lack of
credibility as a repetitive car thief was
2 7 negligible to the
prosecution, catastrophic to the accused.
The court's use of discretion provides for flexibility within the
closely defined area between legitimate impeachment and prejudice. Were it not for this rational element, the boundaries might
harden into the dictates of precedent only to work injustice in
view of the different and unique
fact situations which control the
28
courts' present use of discretion.
Though most courts acknowledge the use of discretion in this
area, some refer to an implied waiver of the privilege of self-incrimination as determinative of the legitimate scope of prosecution
inquiry. 29 This theory stems from the right of the accused against
compulsory self-incrimination.80 According to the implied waiver
argument, the accused does not submit himself to broad crossexamination because he has waived his privilege only with respect to those facts to which he testified on direct examination. 3 1
Though this theory seems to incorporate fundamental constitutional truths and has an appeal to a defendant who desires to control his own destiny,32 it appears to 3obscure the basic principles
involved more than it reveals them.
r
Facing
h- waiver argu26. Id. at 52.
27. Id. at 52-53. Accord, Commonwealth v. Connolly, 217 Pa. Super.
201, 269 A.2d 390 (1970).
28. See, e.g., Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 3491 (1957); United
States v. Angello, 452 F.2d 1135, 1139 (2d Cir. 1971); United States v.
Costa, 425 F.2d 950 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 938; United States
v. Talle, 418 F.2d 53, 55 (5th Cir. 1969); Hellman v. United States, 339 F.2d
36 (6th Cir. 1964); McGowan v. United States, 274 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1960);
This interpretation is generally in accord with F. R. CalM. P. 26 which
provides in pertinent part:
The admissibility of evidence and the competency and privileges
of witnesses shall be governed, except when an act of Congress or
these rules otherwise provide, by the principles of the common
law as they nay be interpreted by the courts of the United States
in the light of reason and experience.
18 U.S.C. rule 26 (1969) (emphasis added).
29. See PRoposED RuLEs, supra note 20 at rule 608, Advisory Comm.
note b.
30. See U.S. CONST. amend. 5; 2 Ann. Cas. 246 (1906).
31. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154 (1958).
32. See note 34 and accompanying text iufra.
33. Admitting that this is an area for discretion allows the court to
measure relevancy, prejudicial effect, nearness in time, etc., i.e. those forces

ment in Brown v. United States,3 4 the Supreme Court severely
limited it:
The witness himself, certainly if he is a party, determines the area of disclosure and therefore of inquiry....
He cannot reasonably claim that the Fifth Amendment
gives him not only this choice but, if he elects to testify, an
immunity from cross examination on the matters he himself has put into dispute. It would make of the Fifth
Amendment not only a humane safeguard against judicially coerced self-disclosure but a positive invitation to
mutilate the truth a party offers to tell ....
The interests of the other party and regard foi the function of
courts of justice to ascertain the truth become relevant,
and prevail in the balance of considerations determining
the scope and limits of the privilege against self incrimination.835
The Court supported its reasoning by considering the dilemma of
a defendant in a typical criminal case:
If he takes the stand and testifies in his own defense,
his credibility may be impeached and his testimony assailed like any other witness, and the breadth of his waiver
is determined by the scope of relevant cross-examination. 6
The Fourth Circuit heard a similar argument from an appellant
who had been convicted of four charges of kidnapping and driving
stolen vehicles across state lines.8 7 The court resolved the appellant's argument against him citing Brown and Fitzpatrick v.
United States.88
When [a defendant] chooses to testify freely to those
events and circumstances which tend to support his defense, neither the Constitution nor any consideration of
justice requires that 'he be permitted selectively to suppress other relevant facts which may be incriminating or
inconsistent with his defense.8 9
The doctrine of fifth amendment waiver will not support the
defendant's contention that he should have control over the scope
of impeachment offered against him.40 He may argue that his
right to take the stand is taken away from him by the combination of the prosecutor's possession of impeaching evidence and the
unknown element of the judge's discretion. 41 However, in McGaucited by Chief Justice Burger in Gordon v. United States without interjecting procedural elements of waiver.
34. 356 U.S. 148 (1958).
35. Id. at 155-56.
36. Id. at 154-55.
37. Carpenter v. United States, 264 F.2d 565 (4th Cir. 1959).
38. 178 U.S. 304 (1900).
39. Carpenter v. United States, 264 F.2d 565 (4th Cir. 1959).
40. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1958); Fitzpatrick v.
United States, 178 U.S. 304, 314-16 (1900); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591,
597-98 (1896).
41. See PROPOSED RULEs, supra note 20 at note 608(b) (no waiver);
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570
(1961).
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tha v. California42 the Supreme Court indicated that this kind of
due process argument will not be persuasive:
It does no violence to the privilege [against self-incrimination] that a person's choice to testify in his own
behalf may open the door to otherwise inadmissible evidence which is damaging to his case.
Again, it is not thought inconsistent with the enlightened administration of criminal justice to require the deand cons in deciding whether
fendant to
4 3 weigh such pros
to testify.
Essentially, the broad theories of discretion and waiver which
bear on the scope of allowable impeachment serve only to focus the
general principle that when the accused takes the stand his credibility is always in issue 44 and that the judge will allow him to be
impeached with evidence which is relevant, probative and fair.
Not only must the prosecutor justify his use of that evidence in
terms of relevance and probative force, he must also show that
fairness under the circumstances compels use of that evidence. 45
An analysis of precedent indicates that the scope of the direct examination of an accused may determine the permissibility of impeachment with immune testimony.
In Agnello v. United States46 the defendant had taken the
stand to deny that he was involved in a conspiracy to violate the
Federal Narcotic Tax Act. Unknown to Agnello, Government
revenue agents had illegally searched his house, thus the cocaine
found in Agnello's house could not be used in the prosecution's
case-in-chief. Although Agnello did not mention the can of cocaine on direct, the prosecutor asked him on cross-examination if
he had ever seen a can of cocaine. The Court found that the impeachment was error and prejudicial to the rights of the accused
and awarded the defendant a new trial.4 7 By not mentioning the
can of cocaine on direct, the Court held that:
He did nothing to waive his constitutional protection
or to justify cross-examination in respect of
48 the evidence
claimed to have been obtained by the search.
The prosecution was unable to justify its impeachment as a rebuttal because the defendant had not mentioned the cocaine on direct.
42. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
43. Id. at 213-15.
44. See note 1 and accompanying text supra.
45. See, e.g., Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
46. 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
47. Id. at 35.
48. Id.

On facts involving the defendant's violation of prohibition
laws the United States Court of Appeals considered an impeachment based on the defendant's role as a bookmaker in a numbers
racket. 49 The defendant in response to the prosecutor's question
admitted involvement.50 The court on appeal noted that the defendant had admitted in his direct testimony that he had played
numbers and, on that admission, reasoned:
Here appellant himself had pretty thoroughly opened
the matter. In admitting that he played the numbers he
was endeavoring to explain his admitted close association
with a co-defendant

who was a bookmaker ....

Cer-

tainly some leeway must be accorded the prosecution in
offsetting the effect of the original testimony of appellant.5 1
The court affirmed the trial court's decision admitting the prosecution's rebuttal testimony even though it incidentally implied an
illegal act by the defendant.52 Reasoning along the same lines, but
indicating that there is a limit on how far the prosecution can take
rebuttal testimony, the same court twenty-two years later remanded a decision because the prosecutor had introduced collateral, inflammatory, and highly prejudicial evidence under the guise
of rebuttal.63 The court in so doing recognized the continued via54
bility of the above rationale for impeachment.
It is true .

.

. that where a defendant, in his direct

testimony, falsely states a specific fact, the prosecution will
not be prevented from proving, either through cross-examination or by calling its own witnesses, that he lied as to
that fact (citations omitted). The rationale behind this
rule is not difficult to perceive, for even if the issue injected is irrelevant or collateral, a defendant should not be
allowed to profit by a gratuitously offered misstatement
(citations omitted). 5

Central to those cases which allow impeachment of the defendant as an attack in the nature of a rebuttal is the idea that the
defendant in his direct testimony overstepped his reasonable
bounds and brought impeachment upon himself. 56 Defendants
49. United States v. Novick, 124 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1941).
50. Id. at 109. Generally, if the witness denies commission of the
other crime, and the evidence proving it is otherwise inadmissible, the
Government is bound by that denial unless there is a conviction of record.
See, e.g., People v. Sarge, 301 N.Y. 198, 93 N.E.2d 637 (1950). See also 3A
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 979 (Chadbourne rev. 1970).
51. United States v. Novick, 124 F.2d 107, 109 (2d Cir. 1941).
52. Id.
53. See United States v. Beno, 324 F.2d 582, 588 (2d Cir. 1963).
54. Id. note 4. The court recognized the cause and effect relationship
between the impeaching cross-examination and the subsequent rebuttal
evidence: "[T]he seeds sown on cross-examination were reaped in the
testimony of the prosecution's rebuttal witnesses. . . ." Id.
55. Id.; Accord, United States v. Coletti, 245 F.2d 781, 782 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, United States v. Russo, 355 U.S. 874 (1957).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Beno, 324 F.2d 582 (2d Cir. 1963); United
States v. Novick, 124 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1941).
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who make sweeping denials of criminal activity 57 or those who
simply deny past infractions's open the door to their own impeachment because they have testified too broadly, they have made
themselves look in the eyes of the jury more law abiding than
they perhaps are in reality.59 Under the doctrine of Walder v.
United States60 such defendants may be impeached by evidence
inadmissible in the Government's case-in-chief.6
The defendant
in Walder testified during his direct examination that he had
never sold narcotics to anyone, given narcotics to anyone, or handled narcotics as a conduit for anyone.62 On cross-examination, the
Government asked him about any history of dealing in narcotics;
the defendant reiterated his earlier testimony to the effect that he
had never sold, purchased or possessed any narcotics. 63 Over defense objection, the prosecutor then questioned him about heroin
with which he had been arrested two years earlier.6 4 The defendant denied that narcotics were taken from him at that time. The
Government later proved that heroin had been taken from him,
albeit unlawfully.6 5 Justice Frankfurter framed the issue before
the Court:
The question

is whether the defendant's assertion

on direct examination that he had never possessed any
narcotics opened the door, solely for the purpose of attacking the defendant's credibility, to evidence of the heroin
unlawfully
seized in connection with the earlier proceed66
ing.

The Court continued with reasoning analogous to that which
67
would allow the impeachment suggested above:
It is one thing to say that the Government cannot make
an affirmative use of evidence unlawfully obtained. It is
quite another to say that the defendant can turn the illegal
method by which evidence in the Government's possession
was obtained to his own advantage, and provide himself
with a shield against contradiction of his untruths.
57. See, e.g., Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64 (1954).
58. See, e.g., Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); United
States v. Coletti, 245 F.2d 781 (2d Cir. 1957). But see United States v.
Provoo, 215 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1954).
59. See Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954).
60. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
61. Id. at 65.
62. Id. at 63.
63. Id. at 64.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 63. The Government had dismissed a case against Walder
two years before the instant prosecution because the heroin it had obtained
from Walder was suppressed. Id. at 64.
66. Id. at 64.
67. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.

*

.

.Of his own accord, the defendant went beyond a mere

denial of complicity in the crimes of which he was charged
and made the sweeping claim that he had never dealt in or
possessed any narcotics. Of course, the Constitution guarantees a defendant the fullest opportunity to meet the accusation against him. He must be free to deny all the elements of the case against him without thereby giving leave
to the Government to introduce by way of rebuttal evidence illegally secured by it, and therefore not available
for its case in chief. Beyond that, however, there is hardly
justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort
to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's
disability to challenge his credibility.6 s
The Walder decision remains a cornerstone in the law of crossexamination and impeachment of an accused. Not only did the
Court find that the defendant who resorts to apparent perjury on
the stand may be the subject of impeachment, but also that the defendant may be impeached by evidence otherwise inadmissible. 69
70
The difficulty, what one court characterized as "agony,1
with Walder was that it was founded on the traditional evidentiary rules of relevancy and on the court's discretion. Because
Walder did not give due consideration to the privileges of the accused or to the role of the exclusionary rules, 71 the lower federal
7
courts severely narrowed its holding.

2

In Harris v. New York, 73 however, the United States Supreme
Court went against the lower court trend by applying Walder's
74
policy to statements obtained in violation of Miranda warnings.
Going even further, the Court extended Walder's strong sanctions
to a defendant who had not opened the door to those inconsistent
statements on direct.7 5 The defendant in Harris had been charged
with two counts of selling heroin to an undercover agent. During
his trial, the defendant admitted making one sale but claimed it
was a sale of baking powder, and further, that it was part of a
scheme to defraud the purchaser. On cross-examination, the defendant was asked if he had, shortly after his arrest, made speci68. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954).
69. Id.
70. See Cunnito v. Sigler, 321 F. Supp. 798, 802 n.1 (Neb. 1971).
71. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hill v. Pinto, 394 F.2d 470 (3d Cir.
1968); Groshart v. United States, 392 F.2d 172 (9th Cir. 1968); Commonwealth v. Padgett, 428 Pa. 229, 237 A.2d 209 (1968); State v. Brewton, 247
Ore. 241, 422 P.2d 581 (Ore. 1967), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 943 (1967).
72. See, e.g., Inge v. United States, 356 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1966) the
court summarized the restrictions it had placed on Walder:
Since then [Walder], we have held that an inadmissible statement can be used only when the defendant makes 'sweeping claims'
that go far beyond the crime charged, is impeached on a statement
relating to lawful proper acts collateral to the issue before the
jury or is questioned about minor points (citations omitted).
Id. at 349.
73. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
74. Id. at 223.
75. Id. at 225.
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fied statements to the police which contradicted in part his testimony on direct. The defendant answered that he could not
remember the questions and answers read to him by the prosecutor
from the earlier statement to the police. The statement given by
the defendant to the police was concededly inadmissible in the
prosecution's case-in-chief because the police officers had neglected
to warn the defendant that he was entitled to appointed counsel
before he answered the questionsT6 The trial judge had therefore
instructed the jury that the inconsistent statements could be
considered only in passing upon the credibility of the defendant.
Petitioner argued that Walder was distinguishable from the
case at bar in that Walder had been impeached as to matters collateral to the crime with which he was charged77 and that Walder
had made sweeping denials on direct, 78 whereas Harris was impeached with statements relating directly to the crime under litigation and had not made any mention of the statements on direct
examination. The Court held: "We are not persuaded that there
is a difference in principle that warrants a result different from
that reached by the Court in Walder.79 In the context of the case,
this holding would indicate that sweeping denial is not necessary
to trigger impeachment with inadmissible evidence so that the
hypothetical defendant could be successfully impeached under the
Harrisrationale.""
Petitioner in Harris raised the policy argument that to allow

this kAnd of impecllenL would undermine the broad purposes of

the exclusionary rules.8 ' By compromising the exclusion, that is,
by allowing the evidence in for some purposes, the court sullies
itself with tainted evidence and provides some encouragement for
illegal police conduct.8 2 But Chief Justice Burger has in the past
76.

Id. tt 224.

77. Brief for Petitioner at 12, Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
78. Id.
79. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971).
80. But compare United States ex rel. Walker v. Follette, 443 F.2d 167,

170 (1971) (requires witness to lie in the course of his testimony before
inadmissible evidence may be used to impeach him).
81. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 344 F.2d 163, 166 (D.C. Cir.
1964); Commonwealth v. Burkett, 211 Pa. Super. 299, 307 235 A.2d 161
(1967) (concurring opinion, Hoffman, J.).
82. The doctrine of exclusion enunciated in Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383 (1914), made applicable to the states in Wolf v. Colorado, 383
U.S. 25 (1949) was formulated by the courts to compel respect for constitutional guarantees by removing the incentive to disregard them. Elkins
v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). The court in Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 656 (1961) framed the purpose in terms of the court's policing the

been skeptical of the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule. In
1960 he observed:
Under the McNabb-Mallory doctrine the evidence is
not excluded to help the defendant or as a right; he is an
incidental and always undeserving beneficiary; he is 'undeserving' because the very thing suppressed is his own admission that he committed the act charged ....
It is only
the protection of the integrity of the processes of law enforcement which can possibly justify the arbitrary and
stringent impact of the suppression of the truth in the judicial search for truth ....
At best the theory that judicial
suppression of the truth has a beneficial effect on the administration of justice is unproved and perhaps unprovable. But, no other basis could conceivably justify the suppression of evidence otherwise admissible.8
In Terry v. Ohio8 4 the Supreme Court noted the limitations of the
exclusionary rule:
[A] rigid and unthinking application of the exclusionary rule, in futile protest against practices which it can
never be used effectively to control, may exact a high toll
in human injury and frustration of efforts to prevent
crime.8

5

The Court in Harris was able to distinguish the prosecution's use
of inadmissible evidence for purposes of impeachment from use
against the defendant in the prosecution's case-in-chief and further
indicated that exclusion from the case-in-chief is of sufficient deterrence value to keep the exclusionary rules viable:
The impeachment process here undoubtedly provided
valuable aid to the jury in assessing petitioner's credibility,
and the benefits of this process should not be lost, in our
view, because of the speculative possibility that impermissible police conduct will be encouraged thereby. Assuming that the exclusionary rule has a deterrent effect on
proscribed police conduct, sufficient deterrence flows when
the evidence in question80is made unavailable to the prosecution in its case in chief.
The Court reiterated the policy arguments of the traditional
approach to the use and scope of impeachment. Clearly, the Court
is revitalizing the idea that where the impeachment is relevant
and probative, it may be employed as a prosecutiorial tactic when
the defendant puts his credibility into issue:
police. See also Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965); C. MCCORMICK,
EVIDENCE § 164 et seq. (2d ed. 1972).

83. Tate v. United States, 283 F.2d 377, 381 (D.C. Cir. 1960). The
case involved the defendant's being impeached with evidence of a statement which though not exculpatory was no more inculpatory than his testimony at trial. It was admitted to show inconsistency and the court affirmed. For a skeptical summary of the exclusionary rule's ineffectiveness
see Irvin v. People of State of California, 347 U.S. 128, 135-37 (1954).
84. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
85. Id. at 15.
86. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971).
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Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his
own defense, or to refuse to do so. But that privilege cannot be construed to include the right to commit perjury
(citations omitted). Having voluntarily taken the stand,
petitioner was under an obligation to speak truthfully and
accurately, and the prosecution here did no more than
utilize the traditional
truth-testing devices of the adver87
sary process.
III. THE SCOPE OF

A GRANT OF IlvumlT

s

Returning to the hypothetical suggested in the Introduction, it
is clear that if the immune testimony can never be later used
against the witness, then no matter how broad or perjurious his
direct testimony, the hypothetical impeachment will be in all cases
impermissible and in most cases prejudicial. To analyze the question of subsequent use, this Comment will present a short summary of the Supreme Court cases on immunity examining them
for their possible anticipation of the later use problem and for the
direction in which they have shaped the law of immunity.
Immunity is not primarily a courtroom tool. It is an investigative aid designed to permit the government to compel testimony
from its citizens without the citizens thereafter experiencing detrimental legal effect. Essentially it is the shock absorber between
two equal and opposite forces permitting each to remain strong by
compromising neither. It allows the Government to obtain the
information i
, to prot
,et '
co mionweai but It also cornprehends the citizen's right not to incriminate himself by sheltering him from future prosecution based on or derived from his
testimony."9
The words of the statute under which the witness is offered
immunity are important to counsel's determination of its scope, 90
...........

87.

Id.

88. Wigmore's definition of immunity bears repetition and will here
be strictly adhered to:
'Immunity' signifies the beneficial result to the offender; 'amnesty' signifies the sacrificial act on the part of the state....
Immunity signifies the non-liability for the offense itself; 'privilege'
signifies the non-compellability to speak about the offense. By an
immunity the offender's guilt ceases; under a privilege it continues.
This distinction is common place, but the failure to observe it
and the improper use of 'immunity' and 'privilege' as interchangeable terms have rendered some judicial opinions needlessly obscure.
3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2281 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
89. See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443 (1972).
90. Immunity is no longer considered a defense, it is a ground for
suppressing the use of evidence. Dixon, Comment on Immunity Provisions,
2 WORKING PAPERS OF THE NAT'L COMM. ON REFORM OF FD. CRim. LAws

1405 (1970) Ihereinafter WoRaxm

PAPERS].

but it is clear through past Supreme Court cases that, to be valid,
the guarantee has to be coextensive with the fifth amendment
right to remain silent.01 Determining the breadth of the constitutional guarantee, and therefore the minimal scope of the immunity
statute, has been the principal area of immunity litigation for the
92
past eighty years.
Listing the shortcomings of a statute 9 3 which provided the
witness with an immunity confined to the direct use of that testimony against him, the Supreme Court in Counselman v. Hitchcock 9 4 found that the statute provided inadequate protection:
It [the statute] could not, and would not, prevent the
use of his testimony to search out other testimony to be
used in evidence against him ... in a criminal proceeding
in such court. It could not prevent the obtaining and the
use of witnesses and evidence which should be attributable
directly to the testimony he might give under compulsion
and on which he might be convicted, when otherwise, and
if he had refused to answer, he could not possibly have
been convicted. 95
The Court found that the provision for testimonial immunity was
not sufficiently broad to supplant the fifth amendment privilege
and Counselman's silence was thereby vindicated. 9 6 The Court,
after a review of many decisions of several states concluded that:
[A] statutory enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute
immunity against future 97prosecution for the offense to
which the question relates.
As the direct result of the Counselman decision, 98 immunity
statutes later enacted by Congress promised what came to be called
a transactional immunity and provided that:
[N]o person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty of forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing, concerning which he may testify, or produce
91. See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
92. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). See also Dixon,
Comment on Immunity Provisions, 2 WORKING PAPERS OF THE NAT'L COMM.
ON REFORM OF FED. CmV. LAws 1405 (1970).

93. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, c. 104, 24 Stat. 374 (1887).
94. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
95. Id. at 564.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 586.
98. For instance, sixteen days after Counselman was decided, Senator
Cullom introduced a new bill which granted immunity in broad transactional terms. See 23 CONG. REC. 6333 (1892). Cullom's bill became the
Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893, Act of Feb. 11, 1893, 27 Stat. 443 repealed by the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. 2514 (1970).
See also 18 U.S.C. 6001 (1970). Pennsylvania has enacted a general immunity statute in its statutory scheme for fighting organized crime.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 640.4 (Supp. 1972).

See PA.
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evidence. ....
99

But this wide grant of immunity created problems unanticipated at
the time of its inception-the repentant criminals or even those
who were anxious only to save their own freedom would try to
testify so broadly that they would touch all the crimes for which
they might later be prosecuted and so immunize themselves in
what was referred to at the time as an "immunity bath."' 100
Malloy v. Hogan'0 1 applied the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination to the states through fourteenth amendment due
process and the Court commented on the scope of the fifth amendment privilege:
The Fourteenth Amendment secures against state invasion the same privilege that the fifth amendment guarantees against federal infringement-the right of a person
to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his
10 2 own will, and to suffer no penalty
...for such silence.
The Court noted with approval the test for invoking the privilege
formulated by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals: 03
[I]n determining whether a witness really apprehends
danger in answering a question, the judge cannot permit
himself to be skeptical; rather he must be acutely aware
that in the deviousness of crime and its detection incrimination may be approached
and achieved by obscure and
04
unlikely lines of inquiry.
Malloy further provided, in the context of its ;acts, that the fourteenth amendment guaranteed to the citizen in the state investigation the same standards with respect to justification of his asserted
privilege as would be applicable in the federal courts.10 5 The
Court noted the kind of answers which would trigger the protection of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination:
The privilege afforded not only extends to answers
that would in themselves support a conviction ... but

likewise embraces those which would furnish
0 6 a link in the
chain of evidence needed to prosecute....
99. Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893, 27 Stat. 444 repealed by Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 13 U.S.C. 2514 (1970), as amended 18
U.S.C. 6001 (1970). See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 451 (1972).
100. See 2 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 90 at 1423.
101. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
102. Id. at 8.
103. See United States v. Coffey, 198 F.2d 438, 440-41 (3d Cir. 1952);
Accord, Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955).
104. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 13 n.9 (1964).
105. Id. at 11.
106. Id.

The extent of this privilege was immediately reflected in the
extent of the immunity required to protect that privilege in Malloy's companion case, Murphy v. Waterfront Commission. 107 The
Court in Murphy wrote:
[W] e hold the constitutional rule to be that a State witness
may not be compelled to give testimony which may be incriminating under federal law unless the compelled testimony and its fruits cannot be used in any manner by federal officials in connection with a criminal prosecution
against him.

We conclude, moreover, that ...

the Federal

government must be prohibited from making any such use
of compelled testimony and its fruits. This exclusionary
rule, while permitting the States to secureg information
necessary for effective law enforcement, leaves the witness
and the Federal government in substantially the same position as if the witness had claimed his privilege in the absence of a state grant of immunity. 0 8
The Murphy Court further notes the proviso which, in terms of the
analysis of the hypothetical suggested in the Introduction may be
of significant import:
Once a defendant 'demonstrates that he has testified,
under state grant of immunity to matters related to the
federal prosecution, the federal authorities have the burden of showing that their evidence is not tainted by establishing that they had an independent legitimate source
for the disputed evidence. 10 9
The conceptual differences between Counselman's implied
right to an immunity which extended to any event regardless of
the extent to which the witness's testimony touched that event
and the Murphy right to an immunity which purported to bar
only prosecutorial use or investigative use of compelled testimony 1 0 resulted in the recent Supreme Court decision, Kastigar
v. United States."' In Kastigar, the Court criticized the overbroad transactional immunity theory and affirmed the Murphy
guarantee as coextensive with the fifth amendment privilege:
We hold that such immunity from use and derivative
use is coextensive with the scope of the privilege against
self incrimination, and therefore is sufficient ,to compel
testimony over a claim of the privilege ....

It prohibits

the prosecutorial authorities from using the compelled
testimony in any respect, and it therefore insures that the
testimony cannot lead12 to the infliction of criminal penalties on the witnesses."
It is unclear whether Kastigar covers the use of immune testimony
to impeach credibility in a later totally unrelated trial. Impeach107.

378 U.S. 52 (1964).

108. Id. at 79.
109.

110.

111.
112.

Murphy v. Waterfront Comm., 378 U.S. 52, 79 n.18 (1964).
See 2 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 90 at 1423.
406 U.S. 441 (1972).
Id. at 453 (emphasis is the Court's).
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ment goes to the credibility of the witness, not to his crime. 113
Kastigar and the cases mentioned before it envision the later use
of the testimony against the accused in criminal prosecution re4
lated, directly or indirectly, to the crimes being investigated.1
The thrust of the transactional immunity cases is much the same,
always relating to present crimes or past crimes. The Court can't
be extending immunity to the testifying witness for crimes to be
committed in the future. In other words, from considering the
fact situations and related holdings in immunity cases to date,
the only indication that the Court would proscribe the use of immune testimony in an unrelated subsequent trial is the Court's
language quoted above which says the testimony will not be used
by the prosecutor "in any respect,""' 5 but there is also support for
the theory that the Court envisioned a related trial with those
words. 116
The Court in Kastigar compares the grant of immunity enunciated in that case with the fifth amendment requirements in cases
of coerced confessions. 117 The analogy is not strained, the testimony compelled under an immunity statute may be likened to
testimony coerced in violation of the fifth amendment. Though
the Court analyzes the analogy in terms limited to procedural
safeguards," 8 it is submitted that the analogy may be further extended to an examination of permissible later use of the coerced
confession." 9 If that kind of testimony may be used against the
defendant to impeach his credibility so should the immune testi113. But see, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 344 F.2d 163 (D.C. Cir.
1964). This statement of definitional principle becomes the center of the
constitutional issue. See note 128 and accompanying text infra.
114. See text at note 112 supra.
115. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972).
116. Precisely because no court has yet decided this issue. In Kastigar
and in all cases cited by it on this point, the facts presented only the later
use at a prosecution directly relating to the crimes about which the petitioner was asked to testify. See, e.g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378
U.S. 52 (1964); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
117. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 461 (1972).
118. Id. at 462.
119. This analogy was also used by the National Commission in its report to the President:
Immunity from use is the only consequence flowing from a
violation of the individual's constitutional right to be protected
from unreasonable searches and seizures . . . and his constitutional
right not to be coerced into confessing. The proposed immunity
is thus of the same scope as that frequently, even though unintentionally, conferred as the result of constitutional violations by law
officers.
Second Interim Report, March 17, 1969, 2 WoRKINa
PAPERS, supra note 90
at 1446.

mony be properly used. Certainly there is ground to argue that
the same policy decisions control and that there ought to be consistency between the two fifth amendment problems.
In Harrisv. New York, 120 the Court allowed the prosecution to
impeach the defendant with evidence obtained in violation of
Miranda v. Arizona.121 Compliance with Miranda has been made
so basic in law enforcement that non-compliance has become the
judicial equivalent of evidence obtained in violation of defendant's
privilege against self-incrimination, 22 but the Court was not persuaded by the petitioner's constitutional argument: "the shield
provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with
prior inconsistent statements.' 12 3 The Court held that Miranda
did not extend so far as to bar the use of an uncounseled statement for impeachment purposes:
Some comments in the Miranda opinion can indeed be
read as indicating a bar to use of an uncounseled statement
for any purpose, but discussion of that issue was not at all
necessary to the Court's holding and cannot be regarded as
controlling. Miranda barred the prosecution from making
its case with statements of an accused made while in custody prior to having or effectively waiving counsel. It
does not follow from Miranda that evidence inadmissible
against an accused in the prosecution's case in chief is
barred for all purposes, provided of course that the
trust
24
worthiness of the evidence satisfies legal standards.1
Certainly as far as the test for legal standards of trustworthiness, it appears that the hypothetical impeachment with immune
testimony would pass constitutional muster as this kind of testi125
mony is typically given under oath.
After Miranda v. Arizona1 26 was handed down in 1966, the
definite trend in judicial decisions was away from the result
reached in Harris. The Miranda Court had said:
But unless and until such warnings and waiver are
demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained27 as a result of interrogation can be used against
him.1
120.
121.
122.

401 U.S. 222 (1971).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Id. at 467. The court said:

We have concluded that without proper safeguards the process

of in custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of
crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to
undermine the individual's will to resist and compel him to speak
where he would not otherwise do so freely.
Id.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971).
Id. at 224.
See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Id. at 479.

Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

The Court framed the constitutional issue in coerced confession
cases in the language of the fifth amendment itself-given a failure
to properly warn the defendant, is the statement so obtained being
used against him, in other words, is it being used in violation of
his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination? Many
of the Circuits 128 have in pre-Harris opinions responded in the affirmative: statements used for impeachment purposes are used to
incriminate the defendant.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
Groshart v. United States129 followed the literal message of Miranda and remanded the case following the prosecutor's use for
impeachment purposes of a statement obtained in technical violation of Miranda:
Whether the objective be to show guilt or to attack
credibility, at the trial the prosecution must first show that
the statements have been obtained in compliance with constitutional requirements as defined in our highest court.'"
The Groshart court rejected the argument that the fifth amendment protective sanction of Miranda did not reach to impeachment.' 3 ' The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit also extended the Miranda holding to the impeachment situation:
To hold otherwise would permit an unconstitutional invasion of an individual's rights to be used as a weapon to influence the jury's consideration of his trial testimony. 13 2
The Third Circuit in United States ex rel. Hill v. Pinto13 3 offered
its rationale for why the Miranda decision protected a defendant's
128. See, e.g., Proctor v. United States, 404 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1968);
United States v. Fox, 403 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1968); United States ex Tel. Hill v.
Pinto, 394 F.2d 470 (3d Cir. 1968); Breedlove v. Beto, 404 F.2d 1019 (5th
Cir. 1968); Groshart v. United States, 392 F.2d 172 (9th Cir. 1968);
Wheeler v. United States, 382 F.2d 998 (10th Cir. 1967); See also Gilday v.
Scafati, 428 F.2d 1027 (1st Cir. 1970) (by implication).
The state courts' trend has also been away from applying Walder v.
United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954) to the coerced confession situation. See,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Padgett, 428 Pa. 229, 237 A.2d 209 (1968); People v
Marsh, 14 Mich. App. 518, 165 N.W.2d 853 (1968); State v. Brewton, 247
Ore. 241, 422 P.2d 581 (1967); People v. Luna, 37 Ill. 2d 299, 226 N.E.2d 586
(1967); People v. Barry, 237 Cal. App. 2d 154, cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1024
(1967). Contra, State v. Kinbrough, 109 N.J. Super. 57, 262 A.2d 232 (1970);
State v. Butler, 19 Ohio St. 55, 249 N.E.2d 818 (1969); People v. Kulis, 18
N.Y.2d 315 (1966).
129. 392 F.2d 172 (9th Cir. 1968).
130. Id. at 174.
131. Id.
132. Wheeler v. United States, 382 F.2d 998, 1001 (10th Cir. 1967).
133. 394 F.2d 470 (3d Cir. 1968).

interest against the use of an inadmissible statement against him
on impeachment:
The undermining of a defendant's credibility is more
devastating to him than the contradiction of a substantive
element of his defense.
We therefore adopt the view that coerced statements
obtained from a defendant ... may not be used to impeach
his credibility merely because the items of the statement
which are used 'do not on the surface add any fresh inculpation to what the defendant has already said on the
stand. 184
So the Third Circuit has gone to the extreme in Pinto by denying
the Government the right to impeach a defendant based on two
earlier less inculpatory but conflicting statements obtained from
him without advising him of his right to counsel. 135 Essentially
the court's holding is that anything which truly impeaches the accused can never be less than incriminating and if that evidence
was obtained in violation of the fifth amendment privilege, it
will not be permitted. Strict compliance with the Miranda rules
suffices to show that the fifth amendment privilege has been respected. The court's hard line with respect to impeachment is supported by the Miranda court's skepticism of what may be termed
by the prosecution-exculpatory statements.
[N]o distinction may be drawn between inculpatory
statements and statements alleged to be merely 'exculpatory.' If a statement were in fact truly exculpatory it
would, of course, never be used by 'the prosecution. In
fact, statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the
defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial
or to demonstrate untruths in the statement given under
interrogation and thus to prove guilt by implication.
These statements are incriminating in any meaningful
sense of the word .... 136
Judge Hoffman of the Pennsylvania Superior Court reflected
this skepticism in his concurring opinion in Commonwealth v.
Burkett. 37 In that case, the defendant had been convicted of rape,
aggravated robbery, aggravated assault and battery, and conspiracy. His sole ground for appeal was the prosecutor's impeaching
question asking if he had given the police the same story that he
had told the court on direct examination. 138 The defendant admitted that he had not. No further mention of the statement was
made, the prosecution admitted that the Miranda warnings had
not been given the accused prior to his statement. 13 9 Concurring
134. Id. at 476.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 473-74.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966).
211 Pa. Super. 299, 235 A.2d 161 (1967).
Id. at 301, 235 A.2d at 162.
Id.
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in the majority's reversal and granting a new trial, Judge Hoffman wrote:
Miranda is based in part on the recognition that such
confessions or statements often lack verity. There is no
reason to suggest that the statement is any more truthful
when uged for impeachment purposes. A similar reason
for exclusion is that any distinctions based on the prosecution's purpose in introducing the evidence are meaningless. An incriminating statement is as incriminating when
used to impeach credibility as it is when used as direct
proof of guilt and no constitutional distinction can legitimately be drawn. (citations omitted) 140
Two months later, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Padgett 41 made Judge Hoffman's concurring opinion the law of the Commonwealth, though the court held that the
use of otherwise inadmissible evidence against a defendant for impeachment purposes did not require reversal when that use could
42
be considered harmless error under Chapman v. California.
The constitutional argument that use of statements obtained
in violation of Miranda for impeachment purposes is a clear use of
that testimony to incriminate the accused was presented to the
Court in Harris. The Court met the argument and distinguished
impeachment from direct use as substantive evidence. 143 The result when the prosecutor presents the accused with immune testimony could be no different. Miranda purported to establish a
constitutional shield as broad as the privilege against self-incrimi44
does the same.
nation; Kastigar'IV.

CONCLUSION

The hypothetical situation where the prosecutor impeaches the
accused with immune testimony presents a problem in two elements. First, there is the question of impeachment and how far
the prosecutor may permissibly go to show that the accused is not
the credible individual he represents himself to be. Secondly, the
legitimate use of a witness' immune testimony is involved. Analysis of these two elements of the hypothetical has been the substance of this Comment.
Under the broad heading of Scope of Impeachment, the two
general limiting factors were presented and discussed. The trial
140.
141.

Id. at 308, 235 A.2d at 165.
428 Pa. 229, 237 A.2d 209 (1968).

142.

386 U.S. 18 (1967).

233 A.2d 552 (1967).

143.
144.

See Commonwealth v. Pearson, 427 Pa. 45,

See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971).
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).

court's use of discretion in determining relevance and probative
force against possible unfair prejudicial effect has been and remains the principle factor in determining the outer boundaries of
permissible impeachment. 45 Courts favoring the restriction of
impeaching evidence to that field of inquiry wherein the accused
has waived or impliedly waived his privilege against self-incrimination are essentially asking the same
questions in a different
146
form and are coming to the same result.
Another problem under the general text of impeachment
arises from the different degrees of denial on direct testimony.
Under the rationale of Walder v. United States147 and its progeny,
it appeared that the defendant making a bare denial of the elements would not be exposed to impeachment to the same degree
as the defendant denying any past infraction who, on the basis of
Walder, could expect potentially ruinous impeachment even by
the use of otherwise inadmissible evidence.
Then Miranda148 came into the evidentiary picture in 1966 and
cast a new light on the permissible use of evidence obtained in
violation of the defendant's fifth amendment rights. Courts began
to doubt the vitality of Walder in the new more constitutionally
aware climate, and the exclusionary rules were employed to keep
such evidence out of court, even for impeachment. 149 Pennsylvania was among those jurisdictions which limited Walder and in
Pennsylvania to date it is extremely probable, almost certain, that
impeachment by immune testimony would not be permitted based
5
0
on Commonwealth v. Padgett" and Commonwealth v. Burkett.' 1
Because of the trend away from the result reached therein,
Harris v. New York' 5 2 became a landmark decision. Restricting
Miranda and its exclusionary sanctions to the prosecution's casein-chief, the court gave a green light to prosecutors who face an accused who apparently perjures himself on the stand. Statements
obtained in violation of the Miranda fifth amendment safeguards
are admissible for purposes of such impeachment and, by analogy,
immune testimony should also be admissible. With Walder revitalized, but with distinctions as to the breadth of the defendant's
direct testimony eliminated, it appears that defendants must anticipate impeachment unless they testify in consonance with their
153
statements given under a grant of immunity.
Assuming then that the impeachment based on the immune
testimony would be allowed under Harris, the analysis turned to
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
347 U.S. 62 (1964).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
See note 72 and accompanying text supra.
428 Pa. 229, 237 A.2d 209 (1968).
211 Pa. Super. 299, 235 A.2d 161 (1967).
401 U.S. 222 (1971).
See note 87 and accompanying text supra.

Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

the scope of protection afforded a witness by a grant of immunity.
The discussion of the relevant case law on immunity suggested
that the cases and their holdings do not fully anticipate later use
of the testimony in an unrelated proceeding except for a general
agreement among the courts that the grant must be as broad as
the privilege against self-incrimination which it abrogates.
The Comment suggests that the ultimate constitutional question faced by the court is, in the language of the fifth amendment: has the immune testimony been used against the witness to
incriminate him? Traditional notions of impeachment indicate
that impeachment goes only to credibility, not to guilt or innocence. 15 4 The discretion of the trial court and his final instructions to the factfinders are to sever or cure any overlap in the
jury's minds. The same rationale indicates that impeachment has
been and should remain an important part of the adversary system's search for the truth and as such would respond to the selfincrimination question in the negative indicating that use for impeachment is not the same as use against the defendant to prove
his guilt. 155
The Comment surveyed those courts which have gone the
other way on this issue asserting that the destruction of the defendant's credibility before the jury was surely just as damaging
as the later proof of a substantive element against him. 156 These
courts would not allow the hypothetical impeachment because the
immunity is to be as broad as the privilege and the privilege asserts the right against self-incrimination. They argue that to impeach the defendant is to incriminate him even though the damage
15 7
is more subtle and elusive.
However, in Harris, the Court sided with the traditionalists.
Skeptical of the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rules, the
Court shifted its emphasis to the operative factors of the trial
court's adversary system. Confident in the trial court's ability to
separate the probative impeachment from that which is prejudicial,
the Court refused to take that discretion away from the courts by
law.158 Though there are those who would argue that the court's
Harris decision can only work to the disadvantage of the accused,
it is submitted that with the decision placed where it ought to be,
that is, with the trial court who knows the most about the facts
154. See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
155. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
156. See note 128 and accompanying text supra.
157. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Burkett, 211 Pa. Super. 299, 301, 235
A.2d 161, 162 (1967).
158. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971).

and problems in each specific case, the interests of both parties
have the best possible chance to be justly served. The Harris decision creates an environment where the immune testimony would
be admitted if the defendant had testified in contradiction to it so
long as, in the trial court's discretion, the testimony was probative
of the accused's credibility and not inordinately prejudicial to his
case-in-chief.
LAWRENCE B. ABRAMS

